








Japan has experienced very slow economic growth, a large bad problem, and an outbreak
of economic scandals in the 1990s.  This paper analyzes what has gone wrong with Japan, both in
terms of macroeconomic performance and financial sector problems.  The macroeconomic malaise
is the direct result of the excesses of the bubble--especially the collapse of stock market and real
estate prices in the 1990s.  But the government exacerbated and prolonged the problem by raising
taxes substantially in 1997 just as the economy was beginning to show signs of recovery.  The
financial sector bad debt problems are also an obvious outcome of the collapse in asset prices, but
were also an inherent danger in Japan’s bank centered financial center.  The paper argues that the
financial system, which may have been useful or at least workable, in earlier postwar years, had
atrophied, leaving bankers less attentive to evaluation of borrowers.  In addition, the system may
have always involved a certain amount of corruption which worsened in the 1980s and 1990s. 
This situation cries out for vigorous and thorough reform, principally through failure of insolvent
institutions and imposition of extensive deregulation.  However, much of government policy
remains very disappointing.  The Ministry of Finance continues to permit financial institutions to
hide their problems, does not favor more bankruptcies, and is not pressing deregulation with any
vigor.  The “big bang” financial reforms are a useful move on the surface, but the reality once the
entire process is completed will be far less helpful than commonly supposed.  Overall, the present
problems and the government’s response to them remains quite disappointing.
1The economic problems facing Japan in the 1990s present a tremendous challenge to
economists.  The economy has experienced relative stagnation since the collapse of the “bubble”
in the early 1990s, and what appeared to be a predictable recovery in 1996 has been snuffed out. 
Meanwhile almost every week brings a new story of corruption related to the financial sector. 
These developments seem all the more startling given the record of success in the preceding four
decades, and the rising sense of confidence among Japanese in the late 1980s concerning the
validity of their economic model. 
How should we interpret what is happening now?  Is Japan on the cusp of major structural
reform or do recent events reflect an inability to escape vested interests and ideological
commitment to the structures of the past?  Or does Japan not need to change?  Do we need to
reinterpret our understanding of how Japan functioned in the past in light of recent economic
problems and revelations about the seamy underside of business and government relationships? 
And what do the answers to these questions imply for the future of the economy--will Japan
continue to drift along below its potential?
These are all large questions with which economists have only begun to grapple.  This
paper sketches out some personal thoughts on aspects of both macroeconomic performance and
financial problems.  The approach is necessarily shallow and sweeping, but the intent is to
provoke discussion rather than to provide definitive answers to the questions raised above.  I have
been optimistic about Japan in the past, but this paper is rather pessimistic.  Although the focus is
on the economic situation, we should all keep in mind that these issues have important political
implications as well.  Domestically, stagnation and unending scandal is souring the mood of the
public, although this may perversely shift political dominance back to the LDP.  Internationally, an
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introverted Japan absorbed in its domestic economic problems will not play a very positive role on
global issues ranging from Middle East crises to vitalization of the U.S.-Japan security
relationship.
The System of the Past
Whether or not one agrees with Professor Noguchi’s argument of Japan operating under a
wartime economic system originating in 1940,1 t is fair to say that the postwar organization of the
economy differed in important respects from the prewar economy and deviated very substantially
from neoclassical models.  The hand of government was heavy, inspired by an explicit goal of
guiding the economy through industrialization, coupled with a strong mistrust of markets. 
Conservative fiscal policies, heavy control over financial markets, corporate governance
emphasizing managerial control, encouragement of company-based unions and lifetime
employment, heavily protectionist trade and investment policies, encouragement of cartels and
other forms of cooperative industrial behavior, and fostering the creation of vertical and
hierarchical keiretsu relationships were all core pieces of this system.  While they did not emerge
from any overarching theoretical concept, in retrospect the various pieces of this structure may
have been mutually reinforcing--a point to which I will return later.
For the financial sector, the hand of government was particularly heavy for reasons that
reflected the desire to guide the economy.  The function of the financial system is to provide the
connection between those in society who save and those engaged in real investment (that is, those
building factories and other real assets), mediating among differing combinations of risk and
return.  This connection can occur in the form of intermediation through banks and insurance
3companies or directly through bond and stock markets.  As taught in American money and
banking courses, there are powerful reasons to assume that a well-functioning financial system
will consist of a combination of all these means.
One of the many differences among these forms of financial structure is the very basic
notion of open markets.  Banking (and insurance investments in Japan, which were largely long
term loans) are in the form of private, negotiated, confidential relationships between creditor and
borrower.  In a competitive banking market, interest rates will reflect the supply and demand for
funds, but the point here is that the contact between borrower and lender is a one-on-one
confidential negotiation.  Bond and stock markets, in contrast, are open markets with daily trading
among many participants based on substantial public disclosure of corporate information that
guides both the conditions for initial issuance of bonds or shares and their subsequent price
fluctuation.  While this distinction has blurred somewhat in the United States with the
securitization of loans, it is key to understanding what the Japanese government did in the
postwar period.
Open financial markets can be a problem for a government desiring to guide the economy. 
Private institutions make decisions on creditworthiness in deciding to underwrite bond or stock
issues, and myriads of individual actors determine the price of those instruments in the market.
Banking and insurance, on the other hand, are much easier for government to influence.  The
Japanese government, therefore, deliberately chose to emasculate the stock and bond markets to
favor intermediation through banks and insurance companies.
Bonds were easily controlled by requiring very stiff eligibility requirements and
discretionary authority for approval by the Ministry of Finance.  This effectively permitted MOF
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to allow only a handful of favored corporations (NTT principal among them) to issue bonds, at
least until the late 1970s.
The stock market was trivialized by eliminating its role as a market for corporate control. 
The evolution of rules and custom (such as mutual long-term holding of shares and issuance of
new shares to existing share holders at part value) which separated stock ownership from
corporate control reduced the stock market to purely speculative game.
Banking and insurance were then controlled through the regulatory game.2  Through total
control of interest rates for both deposits and loans, design and pricing of insurance products, and
entry into both industries, the Ministry of Finance was in a position to virtually guarantee profits. 
In exchange, it behooved banks and insurance companies to pay attention to formal and informal
signals from the government about the allocation of credit.  This stylistic picture is undoubtedly
overdrawn; banks certainly made their own decisions on many loans and did not always slavishly
follow advice or signals.  Banks could also cheat on loan rate limits through use of compensating
deposit requirements for borrowers, but note that government tolerance of this only increased the
profits of the banks by widening the spread between low deposit rates and loan rates.  And
certainly MOF had regulatory goals other than guiding the economy, including an overwhelming
desire to prevent a repetition of the bank failures of the 1920s.  Nevertheless, this model of using
a highly regulated and profitable banking and insurance sector as a vehicle for influencing the
allocation of credit seems largely valid.
5Besides being compatible with the desire of the government to influence or guide the
direction of industrial development, control of the financial system was compatible with broader
aspects of Japanese society (or desirable social values as conceived by a paternalistic
government).  Japanese society has been one in which information does not flow freely except
within group settings characterized by close personal relationships.  Therefore, heavy reliance on
banking with its confidential information relationships rather than open bond and stock markets
was consistent with the nature of information flows within society and reinforced those
tendencies.  The evolution of the “main” bank system to provide the corporate oversight that
equity holders could or did not provide brought long-term personalized relationships between
lender and borrower akin to the long-term vertical keir tsu relationships favored by government
and the private sector.  In this model, even bankers with access to the internal financial accounts
of borrowers did not trust the numbers and developed elaborate personal contacts lubricated by
years of wining and dining plus the dispatch of retiring bank employees to hold positions among
borrowers. All Japanese social groups depend on ceaseless attention to the nuances of personal
relationships in order to function satisfactorily, so bankers acting in similar fashion is not
surprising. 
This heavily controlled Japanese financial system appears to have performed its function of
connecting savers to investors rather well in the 1950s and 1960s.  Households put their savings
in bank deposits and insurance policies, and the banks and insurance firms then lent funds to
industry.  The economy grew quickly (suggesting that the financial system did not misdirect funds
unduly to unproductive uses), bad loans appeared to be minimal, and financial institutions were
profitable.  One can understand the nostalgia in Japan and the continuing belief among many that
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the basic system should not change.  One can also understand the attractiveness of this system to
other countries--such as South Korea--attempting to replicate Japan’s success.
Whether this system was actually a necessary structure for Japan’s economic success,
though, remains controversial.  Conceivably Japan could have prospered with a different financial
structure involving greater reliance on freely operating financial markets.  That question is difficult
to answer, but became relevant in the 1990s with the debate over appropriate development
strategies for other nations.  Certainly the World Bank relegated industrial policy and directed
credit to a relatively minor role in explaining Asian success in its study of the early 1990s.3
This structure also carried risks--a high-growth, bank-centered economic system implied
dangerously high debt-equity ratios in the corporate sector as a whole and especially in the
banking sector.  Not many years ago, economists focused on explaining why the “over loan, over
borrowing” features of the banking sector were not dangerous.  But in retrospect, Japan could
easily have experienced the kind of acute problem facing Korea today at any point in the 1950s
and 1960s.  But a combination of international capital controls, a willingness to use monetary
policy quickly to defend the currency, and the absence of other countries simultaneously following
the same development strategy kept Japan from serious problems.  When Japan survived the
external oil price shocks of the 1970s rather well, confidence in the robustness of the existing
system only increased.4
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Creating a Collosal Problem
Just as confidence in the validity and strength of the overall economic system was
increasing, however, the seeds of the problems of the 1990s were sown.  The oil shock of 1973
hit just as the economy was moving out of the era of 10 percent potential growth; economic
success dictated a lower growth rate in the future and the oil shock merely accentuated the
transition.  Lower growth implied important new pressures within the economy: a chronic
imbalance between desired savings and desired investment levels and rising pressures within the
financial system from segments of the industry dissatisfied with the consequences of changed
financial flows.  
The shift in macroeconomic balances accompanying the slowdown in growth imposed new
demands on the economy.  If society desired to save more than it desired to invest, then other
balances had to compensate.  For the rest of the 1970s the government provided the offset by
running a large fiscal deficit, reaching a peak of 5.5 percent of GDP in 1979.  The issuance of
large amounts of government bonds to finance this deficit became led directly to the gradual
breakdown in tight control of interest rates when banks balked at the low, controlled interest rates
at which the government tried to float increasing amounts of debt.   Once bond rates were
decontrolled, the ripples eventually led to decontrol of other interest rates as well.5
Financial institutions also faced shifting demands for funds in the market that led them to
be discontented with their very narrow niches.  Loan demand from traditional manufacturing
clients did not grow as quickly in the slower economic growth environment of the 1980s. 
8Searching for new, growing markets for loans, banks moved in two important directions: real
estate and overseas.  In both cases, the Ministry of Finance accommodated the pressures with
regulatory changes.  For real estate, MOF encouraged the large commercial banks to create the
jusen as non-bank subsidiaries to engage in real estate lending in the late 1970s.  Internationally,
MOF presided over changes in foreign exchange control which culminated in the revision of the
Foreign Exchange Control Law in 1980.
Table 1
Annual Growth in Bank Lending by Selected Sectors
Percent
Years Total Manufacturing Real Estate Overseas
1976-80 9 5 7 11 
1981-1985 11 6 18 25 
1986-1990 11 0 20 5 
The outcome is displayed in Table one.  During the 15 year period from 1976 through
1990, total bank lending expanded at a relatively even pace over the three 5-year segments, but
the sectoral pattern underwent dramatic change.  Lending to manufacturing was growing at a
rather modest 5-6 percent rate from the mid 1970s to mid 1980s, but was flat in the second half of
the 1980s.  International lending grew very rapidly in the first half of the 1980s, and, surprisingly
grew substantially more slowly in the second half (perhaps because more overseas lending was
handled completely offshore).  Real estate, on the other, continued to accelerate.  From 7 percent
annual growth in the second half of the 1970s, it was up at an 18 percent annual pace in the first
half of the 1980s and then 20 percent in the second half of the decade.
Rapid entry to both real estate and international lending were pregnant with moral
hazzard.  In each case banks were dealing with unfamiliar loan clients.  To evaluate these clients,
9banks relied on their existing routines: weak financial analysis and strong personal relationships. 
While this approach may work in evaluating what is happening in an existing long-term
relationship with a major manufacturing firm, it is fraught with danger in entering unfamiliar
markets.  Combined with this weakness in analytical capability was the continued belief in an
implicit guarantee by the Ministry of Finance.  No financial institutions had failed in the postwar
period, new entry to the industry had been blocked (except for minimal entry by foreign financial
institutions), profits remained high, and deposits continued to pour in from the public.  This
combination of factors was almost guaranteed to lead to problems.
These structural changes dovetailed with macroeconomic developments.  The story of the
bubble in the second half of the 1980s is well known and does not need much detail here.  Faced
within an economic slow down that could have led to recession in the wake of the enormous
appreciation of the yen from the spring of 1985 to 1987, the government responded with
monetary ease.  This was a deliberate choice; the government could have used an expansionary
fiscal policy but MOF opposed any departure from the long-term goal of eliminating the large
fiscal deficit that had emerged in the 1970s.  Monetary ease did have the intended impact of
propping up the economy--annual real economic growth from 1987 through 1991 averaged 5
percent.  Arguably this growth exceeded Japan’s long-term potential growth, and it certainly
resulted in very tight labor markets.  Normally this would have lead to higher inflation, but yen
appreciation had put manufacturers under strong price pressure (either because they needed to
absorb a large part of yen appreciation in order to maintain market share abroad or because they
faced new pressures from imports at home).  So rather than general price inflation, Japan got
asset inflation.
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By 1989 even MOF acknowledged that the bubbles in real estate and stock prices were
unsustainable and responded by tightening monetary policy.  At the time, MOF officials seemed to
be very confident that they could simply let the excess air out of the two markets, which would
only hurt “evil” speculators.  Instead, all of the gains since 1985 were eliminated with the
predictable outcome of large amounts of bad debt. Although the stock market stabilized after
1993 (with the Nikkei average subsequently gyrating between 14,000 and 20,000), land prices
continued to fall at least through 1997.6
Identifying the magnitude of these bad debts is complicated in Japan because of the very
lax requirements on reporting non-performing loans.  As of September, 1997, the Ministry of
Finance announced that the banking sector held ¥28 trillion ($225 billion at then current exchange
rates) in non-performing loans, but admitted late in 1997 that by a broader definition, “problem”
loans totaled some ¥79 trillion ($630 billion), a number that began to approximate what private
sector analysts have believed for some time.7  This larger amount comes to about 15 percent of all
bank lending in Japan and as a ratio to GDP comes to 16 percent.  
Note that all these figures are only for commercial banks--insurance companies and
securities houses also harbor large financial losses.  Japanese insurance companies rushed into the
U.S. Treasury bond market in the 1983-1985 period when the yen was trading in the ¥220-260
range, and then rode the exchange rate down.  Securities firms invested on their own account in
11
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the stock market and lent money to other speculators through non-bank subsidiaries.  Estimates of
the total hidden losses among all financial sector firms vary, though I have seen one high estimate
of $1.5 trillion.
More bad news may be on the way.  Japanese banks have been major lenders to other
Asian countries--representing roughly one third of international loans to Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia.  Officially, Japanese lending to Asian countries totaled some $125 billion in the
summer of 1997.8  An unknown portion of these loans is non-performing, but if Japanese banks
behaved with the same lack of prudence as they did in other markets, the prognosis is not good. 
While the size of lending suggests that any bad loan amount would look quite small relative to the
existing domestic bad loan problem, these additional problems come at the margin.  That is, banks
are already weakened and not in a good position to absorb additional losses. 
Overall, one can explain the emergence of the bad debt mess in the 1990s as the
unfortunate combination of a banking system with weak analytical skills, structural shifts in the
demand for funds after the mid 1970s, and the monetary ease of the second half of the 1980s. 
This explanation, though, puts the most charitable face on what was happening to Japan in the
1980s.  In the scandals that have emerged in the 1990s have come truly shocking revelations of
indiscretion and malfeasance (at least shocking in frequency of exposure; much of the revealed
behavior seems quite unsurprising).
Favored investors at securities firms were given guarantees of high positive rates of return
on their equity portfolios (and an embarrassed government continues to refuse to release the list
12
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of names on Nomura Securities “VIP” list since it includes politicians and career bureaucrats).9 
Huge loans went to small businesses for speculation in real estate and the stock market--including
the infamous bankruptcy of small restaurant owner Mrs. Onoue in Osaka, who defaulted on debts
worth $3 billion (with the supposedly staid Industrial Bank of Japan as her largest lender).10 
Large banks eagerly introduced crooked clients to subsidiary banks or credit co-ops in order to
keep questionable loans off their own books while hopefully benefitting from the illicit business,
relationships revealed when some of these credit co-ops went bankrupt.11  Financial institutions
(and other corporations) continued to pay off sok iya racketeers who threatened to reveal
negative information at annual shareholder meetings.  Ministry of Finance officials told banks
when their “surprise” inspections would occur in exchange for lavish entertainment and other
favors.12  Those examinations were often perfunctory at best, enabling firms to hide their
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imprudent, unethical, or illegal activities, as happened in the Daiwa Bank scandal in New York.13 
Allegations have been made concerning Ministry of Finance explicit approval of (or even
administrative guidance recommending) illegal schemes to hide financial problems at Yamaichi
Securities.14  And even Bank of Japan officials have now been implicated in providing advance
information on Bank market operations to the private sector.15  The  scandals have gone far
beyond being isolated incidents and paint a picture of widespread routine corruption and
incestuous relations among financial firms, their clients, government officials, and politicians.
Responses
Restoring the economy to a healthy growth is critical to any effort to overcome the
financial problems of the 1990s.  In a growing economy, new loans cause the share of old non-
performing loans to shrink, reducing the relative cost to financial institutions as they write off
these loans and dispose of the underlying assets.  But the government’s record is not encouraging.
From 1992 through 1995 Japan grew on average annual rate of only 0.6 percent on an
inflation-adjusted basis, and over the longer 1992-1997 period the annual rate was 1.3 percent.
Perhaps this could be considered a good performance; asset deflation was so severe that the
economy was lucky to escape with several years of sluggish growth rather than an outright




















contracted (though this may happen now with back-to-back declines in the fourth quarter of 1997
and the first quarter of 1998).  Therefore, what happened to Japan in the 1990s is properly labeled
relative stagnation or sluggishness rather than a recession.  That is, performance is sub-par when
compared to either the 1980s or to potential growth rates (which was arguably around 2 to 2.5
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Figure 2
Government Balance as a Share of GDP
Source: Economic Planning Agency, A nual Report on National Accounts, 1996 edition, p. 83; and
Salomon  Brothers, Japanese Economic/Market Analysis: Japanese Macroeconomic Chartbook,
October 31, 1997.
In response to stagnation, the government dropped interest rates to historic lows (with the
discount rate at only 0.5 percent since September 1995), but low interest rates were insufficient to
stimulate economic activity.  Since the private sector had overinvested in plant and equipment in
the late 1980s and early 1990s (on the erroneous assumption that high rates of 4 to 5 percent
economic growth would continue in the 1990s), the private sector was saddled with excess
capacity and little desire to invest even at low interest rates.  What Japan needed was fiscal
stimulus to increase domestic demand and raise capacity utilization.  Prodded strongly by
domestic and international voices to use an expansionary fiscal policy, the government announced
a temporary income tax cut in 1994 and increased spending (principally public works spending). 
The Ministry of Finance was extremely reluctant to agree to this policy (with its resistance
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including efforts to avoid meeting with U.S. Treasury and Embassy officials in the fall of 1993 and
winter of 1994).  At the time, the parade of economic stimulus packages from 1993 through 1995
were criticized for containing far less real stimulus (ma iz--real water) than advertised. 
Nevertheless, the final outcome was both a reduction in taxes and substantial increase in spending
which widened the government deficit. As shown in figure 2, the change in the overall
government balance since 1991 has been rather dramatic, although a substantial portion of this is
due to the effect of economic stagnation on tax revenues rather than deliberate fiscal policy.
In 1996 the economy finally showed signs of recovery, expanding at a strong 3.6 percent
rate.  As shown in figure one, the economy appeared to be undergoing a weak recovery after the
bottom in 1993, with 1996 finally representing the kind of strong growth one expects in the early
phases of recovery with excess capacity.  But from April 1, 1997, the dogmatic Ministry of
Finance chose to end the income tax cut, increase the nation-wide sales tax (from 3 percent to 5
percent), and raise other government fees (including the co-payment by individuals in the national
health care system).  Estimates vary, but these changes in fiscal policy represented a net
withdrawal of as much as 2.5 percent of GDP and may have had an additional negative
psychological impact on households and businesses.  Rather than continuing a path of recovery,
the economy was stagnant again in calendar 1997 (0.9 percent growth) and may be flat or
negative for fiscal 1997.  Forecasts for fiscal 1998 are in the range of only one percent or less.  In
retrospect, the apparently strong performance of the economy in 1996 may have been
exaggerated; by mid-year it was clear that the consumption tax would rise in 1997, leading to
increased housing investment and other purchases in the second half of the year.  
The conventional wisdom within the government had been that the consumption tax
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increase would result in an artificial jump in consumption in the first quarter of 1997, followed by
a drop in the second quarter, after which the economy would return to normal.  But domestic
demand remained weak through the rest of the year, and the decline in housing investment and
automobile sales continued to drift downward.  Finally responding to criticism of its actions and
the resulting economic weakness, the government  devised a modest income tax cut for fiscal
1997 (payable in the form of a rebate to taxpayers only in February and March of 1998).  But this
action was very reactive and the size of the stimulus added to the economy (¥1.5 trillion) was
small, followed by subsequent belligerent statements that the government would contemplate no
further measures.  This tax cut almost appears to have been deliberately devised to prove MOF’s
belief that tax cuts will not help the economy because households have a high marginal propensity
to save; households are more likely to save the tax cut if they believe the benefit will be only a
fleeting one.
Despite the belligerence, politicians and bureaucrats have been hinting to Americans that
further fiscal stimulus--including a tax cut--will be forthcoming in April (after the regular budget
passes the Diet).  But these hints hardly undo the damage from the intermittent nature of fiscal
stimulus, and the damage to the government’s image from pursuing a very reactive policy (that is,
by giving the appearance that it sets policy primarily on the basis of complaints from abroad and
home rather from any real conviction).  And the rumor mill suggests that the final package will
probably rely mainly on traditional public works spending and some corporate tax incentives
rather than an income tax cut.
The reluctance to use fiscal policy to stimulate the economy stems from the recognition
that the government balance will deteriorate in the future as the aging population impacts the
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social security account (an impact that will be far larger than the one in the United States).  Given
that future deterioration, the government faces a long-term need to reduce its deficit on
discretionary spending.  But this shift will occur over the space of several decades and did not
require such quick action in 1997.  Furthermore, much of the concern over deficit spending is
buttressed with numbers on gross government debt which may not provide an accurate picture. 
Net government debt is actually quite low in Japan.  Therefore, the government moved too
rapidly and too far to restore its fiscal balance in the spring of 1997.  
Restoring economic growth should be just as important a goal as long-term reduction of
the government deficit.  Domestic financial problems would diminish in a growing economy, and
the burden of financing the retirement of a larger percentage of the economy becomes easier if
there is a larger economic pie to divide in the future. Thus the dogged determination to pursue
fiscal austerity now will hurt the future of the economy by delaying recovery from financial
weakness and reducing the future size of the economy.
Meanwhile, the government has dealt directly with the problems of the financial sector. 
Throughout the 1990s the Japanese government has endeavored to resolve these problems
through traditional means.  This is a model in which:  the public is denied the truth in order to
prevent them from worrying about stability of the system; weak or insolvent institutions are
absorbed by stronger ones; government money flows to prop up the weakest links; and eventually
renewed growth in the economy pushes asset prices back up before losses must be declared. 
When the economy was growing rapidly and failures were few, this approach worked.  But the
extent of the losses in the 1990s and the inability of the government to get the economy growing
fast enough to push the stock and real estate markets back up undercuts the viability of the
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traditional model.
It would be a serious error to suppose that apparent failure of the traditional model has
now led to a market-oriented approach of letting the weak collapse, forcing investors to take their
losses, and selling off assets at market prices to get them back into productive use.  From 1993
through 1996 about a dozen small institutions failed--the seven jusen, several credit cooperatives,
and a small regional bank.  Although these bankruptcies were played up in the Japanese press as
unprecedented changes, the reality was that these institutions represented a trivially small part of
the financial sector.  In 1997 a small life insurance firm (Nissan Life) and a small securities firm
(Sanyo Securities) failed, and then the Ministry of Finance finally allowed two larger institutions
to fail--Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank.  When those events occurred, the
press reported that market rules were now in play and financial institutions would have to sink or
swim on their own.16  
Such pronouncements proved to be premature.  The shutdown of Yamaichi Securities
took over six months, during which time most of the employees were kept on the payroll--
financed with “loans” from the Bank of Japan.  During the shutdown phase, the Ministry of
Finance continued to seek firms to take over all or substantial portions of Yamaichi (Merrill
Lynch, for example, is taking over a set of 30 Yamaichi local offices and approximately 2,000
employees).17  Similar efforts with Hokkaido Takushoku bank proved successful--Hokuyo Bank
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(a regional bank in Hokkaido) agreed in December 1997 to acquire all of Hokkaido Takushoku’s
operations (buildings, employees, liabilities, and assets) within the prefecture, and Chuo Bank
agreed in February 1998 to acquire all of the banks’ operations outside of Hokkaido.18  This deal
was sweetened with promises that the government would buy preferred shares and absorb some
bad loans. This is hardly the stuff of a cruel and impartial market.  Few people will be left
unemployed and few, if any,  assets will be auctioned off.
Furthermore, rather than signaling the beginning of a new policy, the failure of these two
large institutions has been a reaffirmation of old policies.  The vision of the president of Yamaichi
Securities crying on television and the notion of employees out on the heartless sidewalk proved
too much for bureaucrats, politicians, and the public.  Early in 1998, the Ministry of Finance
designed and the Diet passed a ¥30 trillion ($240 billion) financial bailout plan.  Of this amount,
¥17 trillion ($135 billion) was to increase the Deposit Insurance Corporation’s fund to reimburse
depositors of insolvent banks, a necessary move since the fund was exhausted.  But the other ¥13
trillion ($105 billion) was for purchase of new issues of preferred shares and subordinated bonds
to be issued by banks--a move to improve their capital base.  
Banks certainly need some recapitalization.  Japanese banks have always been weakly
capitalized, but no one was concerned when economic growth was high and bad loans few.  Now
banks have seen their capital erode as they have written off bad loans.  Furthermore, those large
banks engaged in international lending are suffering from the unfortunate decision in the 1980s to
permit them to count a portion of their unrealized gains on stock holdings as part of the capital
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base.  At the time, the Ministry of Finance had pushed hard at the Bank of International
Settlements conference to permit Japanese banks to do this.  One of the motives for the
establishment of BIS capital adequacy ratios for banks, in fact, was directed against the Japanese,
who were accused of engaging in imprudent lending behavior in international markets,
underpricing the market and driving down profits for other banks.  Partial inclusion of stock
holdings permitted the Japanese banks to meet the 8 percent capital adequacy requirement when it
went into effect, but left them exposed to the vagaries of stock market fluctuations.  Major
Japanese banks are once again in danger of not meeting the BIS standard.  Furthermore, smaller
banks not engaged in international lending are presumed to have capital ratios even lower (if not
negative) and MOF wants them to meet a weaker 4 percent capital adequacy ratio, though it then
sent signals at the end of 1997 that enforcement would be “flexible.”19  Ther fore, banks need a
real increase in capital base.
Putting government money into bank ownership as a means for providing this
recapitalization, however, is a terrible policy.  Doing so injects moral hazard into the banking
system (encouraging banks rescued by these new capital infusions to gamble on higher-risk
investments to increase their earnings). It also makes the government even less willing to let weak
institutions fail because government money and reputation will be at risk--permitting a bank which
has received government money to fail would imply that MOF made a mistake in supporting the
bank in the first place.  
Most importantly, this infusion increases Ministry of Finance influence over the whole
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banking industry.  Having decided to prop up weak banks, MOF was afraid the public would then
know which banks were weak.  To hide the truth from the public, large (presumably stronger)
banks are also accepting this government fund infusion.  In the initial tranche in mid-March, the
21 largest banks all issued preferred shares or subordinated bonds to the government, totaling
¥2.1 trillion ($16 billion), enough to raise the capital ratio of the 9 city banks by about one
percentage point.20  Actually, besides obscuring the distinction between strong and weak banks,
this policy seems to have been motivated by a strong desire to make the largest banks look better
abroad and perhaps cause the “Japan premium” in international lending markets to fall.
Rather than moving to a tough but realistic policy of letting weak institutions fail, the
government now has a high-priority goal of preventing further bankruptcies.  Clearly the banking
sector needs recapitalization, and in extremis, why not use government money?  Beyond the
doubts expressed above, there is another missing element.  Some banks are truly insolvent; some
are weak and poorly managed; and some are well managed and have relatively strong balance
sheets.  One of the functions of recession or crises is to weed out the failures.  In the United
States, thousands of banks failed in the 1930s before the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
provided capital infusions.  In the 1980s, hundreds of savings and loan institutions failed before
the Resolution Trust Corporation repackaged and resold their assets.  In Japan none of this will
happen.  In theory, the committee to review applications for capital infusion will discriminate
between weak and insolvent banks, with the truly insolvent left to fail (and depositors protected
by the new infusion of money into the Deposit Insurance Corporation).  In reality, little or none of
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this will happen.  Virtually all banks will be protected and the system as a whole will be weaker
and recover more slowly because of this.
A final justification for government involvement is also somewhat suspect.  In February
1998, the Japanese media began emphasizing the existence of a domestic credit crunch.  Even
reputable borrowers reported that their traditional lenders were refusing to roll over loans because
the banks were so concerned about improving their balance sheets.21  Some d gree of bank credit
crunch may actually exist, but there are reasons to be doubtful of the press reports.  First, large
healthy borrowers have alternative sources of funds (the bond market, foreign banks, etc.). 
Second, a credit crunch should not be confused by a desirable trend of banks cutting credit to
risky borrowers who should never have gotten loans in the first place.  Third, the deluge of stories
of a credit crunch came conveniently at a time when the government had already decided to bail
out the banking sector and probably felt a need to generate public sympathy for the plan.  Bank
lending in January 1998 was 0.2 percent below the year-earlier level, a small decline well within
the trend the of previous several months and more likely the result of lack of loan demand than a
credit crunch.22
Besides this new special fund for recapitalizing banks, the Japanese government has other
means to inject money into the corporate sector without public knowledge.  Part of social security
funds, postal savings funds, and postal life insurance funds are routed through government
subsidiary organizations which have a mandate to make portfolio investments in the private
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sector.  Roughly 13 percent of social secutity funds are routed to the Nenkin Fukushi JigyÇdan
(Public Welfare Service Public Corporation or PWSPC), and 2.5 percent of Postal Savings and 12
percent of Postal Life Insurance funds are routed to the Kan’i Hok n Fukushi JigyÇdan (Postal
Life Insurance Welfare Corporation or PLIWC).23  These government-owned organizations then
place the funds with financial institutions to engage in portfolio investment.  These funds can be
quietly invested in weak financial institutions or used to help prop up overall stock market prices
without any real knowledge on the part of the media or public.  What has probably been a quiet
policy (though assumed to be occurring by the financial community) has now become explicit.  In
mid-March of 1998, the LDP agreed to use up to ¥1.3 trillion (just over $10 billion) in funds from
Postal Savings during the rest of March to prop up the stock market.24 
Meanwhile, a variety of other schemes appeared in 1998 to provide gimmicks to improve
financial institution balance sheets and thereby avoid public recognition of weakness or
insolvency.  Firms have traditionally shown assets at purchase cost on their balance sheets, which
has long injected an element of unreality to accounting results.  Financial institutions will now
revalue real estate holdings (mainly the land on which their offices and branches sit) to market
value, bringing some reality.  But they do not have to do the same with stock portfolios; many
financial institutions hold portfolios of shares purchased near the peak of the stock market, and
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they will be able to keep these listed as assets at those high purchase prices rather than marking
them down to current value.25  M anwhile, MOF moved in early 1998 to put stringent controls on
short selling in the stock market, with the obvious intent to lessen downward pressure on prices, a
move in clear violation of the spirit of deregulation and decontrol of innovation in financial
markets..26  
Banks will also be able to net out positions with individual customers.  Rather than
showing a single client’s loans on the asset side of the books and deposits on the liability side, the
asset side will show only the net position (loans minus loans).  This artificially reduces assets,
thereby improving the bank’s capital to asset ratio.27  Even without a background in accounting,
one assumes that such a practice is a gross violation of accounting principles.
Finally, the government has discussed using public funds to buy real estate to prop up
prices or buy asset-backed securities representing bad debts of banks at above-market prices. 
Once again, the effort is to artificially alter prices.  Government might be able to generate a small
change in land prices by accelerating purchases of land for future public works projects, but this
cannot continue in the long run.  In fact, given long-term demographic trends and probable
economic growth, land prices may be entering a very long period in which they will be flat or will
continue to decline.
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One can hardly imagine a litany of worse policies to deal with financial problems in Japan. 
These policies will cause a prolongation of the debt problem, artificially prolong the life of weak
financial institutions that are a drag on the economy, and yield a financial sector partially owned
by the government.  Gimmicks and government capital infusions will probably accomplish the
purpose of staving off a serious financial collapse, but at the expense of longer-term weakness and
delay in resolving the situation.
But there may be a logic to what has happened in Japan.  Much of the policy response has
been consistent with other economic and social themes.  In particular, the American notion of
shutting down insolvent institutions, auctioning off assets to new owners, and getting on with
economic growth does involve both unemployment (at least temporarily) and wealth transfer. 
These are very difficult concepts within Japanese society.  Job security has been such a core value
in postwar Japan that accepting the unemployment consequences of failing financial institutions
(which presumably practice lifetime employment) is a frightening departure from the presumed
social compact.  Even the employment or career path implications of merger and acquisitions have
been far more difficult in Japan than the United States to implement efficiently.
Nor has the notion of expropriation of property for non-payment of debts been very well
developed; the willingness of banks to sit on non-performing loans without foreclosure and sale of
the underlying real estate collateral appears to be motivated by more than just the reluctance to
accept losses.  Except in highly publicized cases of yakuza involvement or flagrant illegal activities
(such as those surrounding the lending behavior of a credit cooperative with close ties to former
LDP member Toshio Yamaguchi) one gets the distinct impression that banks are reluctant to
actually foreclose on property owners.  However, this point should not be overdrawn; of the
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12,000 bankruptcies in Japan in 1997, most moved forward under the dissolution (hasan)
provisions of the law rather than any of the reorganization provisions (implying that most formal
bankruptcies do involve dissolution of the firm and transfer of collateral to the creditors).28
Deregulation
In the midst of these policies to deal with bad debt problems, Japan is presumably engaged
in sweeping deregulation of financial markets.  In November 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro
Hashimoto called for a Japanese “Big Bang” deregulation of financial markets, borrowing his
rhetoric from the deregulation of London financial markets in the 1980s.  The agenda (See table
2) for deregulation includes a variety of proposed measures affecting virtually all aspects of
finance, which on the surface imply movement toward a much more market-oriented system.  The
list is actually considerably longer, but many of the other items proposed are either quite minor or
rather vague.  Changes in regulations concerning foreign exchange transactions, removal of the
holding company ban, and decontrol of brokerage commissions will all begin in 1998, with other
moves hopefully occurring over the following three years.
On the surface, the list of proposed changes is quite ambitious and would seem to drive
Japan in the direction of greater reliance on markets and competition.  Many of the concerns
raised above about the government’s response to financial problems should be moot as these 
28
Table 2
Proposed “Big Bang” Financial Deregulation: Principal Components
Foreign Exchange.  From April 1998, elimates the limitation on foreign exchange business to licenses commercial banks; eases
rules on non-financial firms netting out exchange positions internally; permits firms to use foreign exchange in domestic transactions; 
eases limitation on individuals maintaining foreign currency accounts abroad.
Brokerage Commision..  Deregulation of stock brokerage commissions, beginning with large-lot transactions (April 1998) and
eventually extended to all transactions.
Off-Exchange Trading.  Eases rules concerning trading shares off-exchange.
Over the Counter Trading.  Eases rules concerning the over-the-counter market with the intent of increasing the liquidity of the
market.
Securities Transaction Tax. To be eliminated.
Financial Holding Compannies.To be permitted, with certain restrictions on size and market share of the total entity and the
individual companies held.
Asset-Backed securities.  To be legalized and encouraged.
Dervivatives.  Rules to be eased including those pertaining to trading on the exchanges and over-the-counter.
Insurance.  Price competition and product design competition to be allowed, along with a removal of the separation between life
and non-life segments of the market.  Other changes include greater flexibility in marketing (permitting telemarketing, for example).
Segmentation.  Through the financial holding company format and other means, restrictions among different forms of financial
business will be lessened.  This includes permission for commercial banks and non-bank financial firms to issue bonds.
Accounting Standards.  Will move accounting practices closer to international standards, including requirements for reporting
on a consolidated basis and use of current market values.
reforms reduce the government’s ability to manipulate markets. But will this really happen?  While
the proposed changes are a useful step forward, there are substantial reasons to be skeptical about
the outcome.  Consider the following:
Deregulation versus Bailout.  The recent crop of actions related to bailout of the
financial sector just discussed speaks volumes about the true attitude of the government.  Neither
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the Ministry of Finance career bureaucracy nor the politicians are truly interested in liberating 
financial markets and allowing the weak to fail.  No matter what the surface image of the “big
bang” reforms, these attitudes and ad hoc policies based on them will remain.  The Ministry of
Finance has endorsed a gradual deregulation process over the past 20 years, but shows few signs
of truly embracing an American-style framework for finance. Many officials and academics have a
visceral belief that the “Japanese system” of capitalism is still better than the American model,
refuse to believe their system of the past is outmoded despite current problems, and are dedicated
to just patching it up.  Consider, for example, that one of the supposed czars of (international)
financial deregulation is Eisuke Sakakibara, Director General of International Finance at the
Ministry of Finance, who is an outspoken believer in the superiority of the Japanese system.29 The
decision in 1997 to change accounting rules and create a 4 percent capital adequacy ratio for
purely domestic banks, followed by the deluge of measures in 1998 to eviscerate the meaning of
these changes is eloquent testimony to the unwillingness of the government to accept the fate of
the market.
The Politics of Deregulation.  Prime Minister Hashimoto and the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP have an overriding concern with restoring the numerical majority of the party in the
Diet.  They seem to believe that the appearance rather than the reality of change and progress is
sufficient for that purpose.  The general deregulation agenda has resulted in a very long list of
individual regulations on which some action has taken place, without much real change in the
regulatory role of the government in the economy.  The same is true of  administrative reform,
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characterized by a reshuffling of the ministries without altering the fundamental relationship of the
state to the people.  Even though the big bang reforms for finance appear to be stronger, one is
tempted to assume that MOF and the politicians expect to limit the real impact.  If the public truly
favored radical change, presumably the political system would respond.  Voters can always vote
the rascals out and install other politicians.  But this is not happening, and the LDP may actually
succeed in its goal of returning to an absolute majority.  When the government was planning the
jusen bailout, there was some visible protest (including marches on MOF, which closed its gates
and was protected by phlanxes of police for several weeks).  But the current much larger bailout
package with much larger implications for use of taxpayers’ money to prop up insolvent
institutions appears to be generating virtually no protest.
Exaggerated Claims.  Some changes involve wildly exaggerated claims concerning their
impact.  This is particularly true of the foreign exchange decontrol occurring on April 1, 1998. 
Japan undertook major foreign exchange decontrol over the period from about 1976 to 1985, so
what is left to be done?  Most foreign exchange transactions are not regulated at the present in
any meaningful way, so the new law and rules coming in to effect will make little difference. 
Restriction of foreign exchange transactions to authorized commercial banks will be dropped, so
that any company--financial or non-financial--can engage in foreign exchange.  But over 160
banks are currently authorized to engage in this business; it is unclear that expanding the number
will really inject much more competition into the market.  Proponents note that convenience
stores (Seven Eleven, Family Mart, etc.) could enter the exchange business, but one wonders
what difference this would really make other than convenience (since their daily volume of
business is unlikely to be sufficiently large to make them a driver of more competitive commission
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fees).  Netting out foreign exchange transactions without even going to a bank provides a modes
efficiency gain for non-financial corporations, but one presumes that many of them have already
been doing so (which was permissible with the approval of MOF, and obviously possible for any
other firm willing to violate the rules).
Firms will also be allowed to even make domestic transactions in foreign currencies, rather
than repricing imported products into yen.  A trading company, for example, could sell imported
oil to domestic power companies in dollars rather than yen.  But all this accomplishes is a shift of
exchange risk from importers to other companies, which may or may not be a useful change. 
Theoretically the greater freedom permits efficient packaging of exchange risk in contract
negotiations.  But if the trend were for strong companies (such as the large general trading
companies) to use their market power to push the exchange risk on to smaller domestic firms,
then the change could conceivably be detrimental.  
Finally, individuals are to be allowed to hold foreign financial accounts.  Here is another
puzzling development, since some Japanese do exactly this already.  But one should ask if
opening foreign accounts is likely to be the major path for individuals to invest abroad. 
Americans, who have not had any legal restrictions, hold only a minuscule amount (less than 0.01
percent) of their portfolios in foreign deposits and even allowing for non-reporting for tax
cheating purposes, the amount is unlikely to be high.30  Japanese individuals already have access
to yen-denominated money market and mutual funds that are invested in foreign markets, and
offerings of such funds (including by foreign financial institutions operating in Japan) have
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increased in the past year.  Thus, the freedom individuals obtain on April 1 is unlikely to bring a
major alteration in investment behavior.  Note also that even this small change is being
undermined; the Ministry of Finance has announced new and onerous reporting requirements for
any individual moving more than the equivalent of $15,000 into or out of the country.  These
rules could have a chilling effect on individual behavior.
Disclosure.   A deregulated financial system which moves away from the past bank-
centered model requires a high level of public disclosure of accurate corporate information (and
controls on favored insider access to information).  As noted above, the preference for a bank-
centered system--with its reduced need for public information--was entirely consistent with the
generally poor public flow of information in Japan.  This at least suggests that movement toward
financial markets that depend on reliable public information may be difficult to achieve.  The
proposed changes in accounting rules (registering assets at current market value) that are part of
the big bang are a step in the right direction, but even this change has been undermined by the
various gimmicks the Ministry of Finance has introduced in 1998 to help financial institutions
conceal their true weakness.  
Personnel Practices.  Attempted deregulation of the financial may be incompatible with
deeply ingrained personnel practices.  Japanese corporations—both financial and non-
financial—have strongly favored management personnel systems in which management career
employees rotate broadly through the organization rather than becoming specialists.  But complex
financial markets require high levels of specialized expertise that may be at odds with this practice. 
Even if managers need not carry out financial analysis themselves, they need to be sufficiently
knowledgeable and skilled to understand what their staff people are doing (a failing that was a
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principal part of the Daiwa Bank scandal in New York).  
Furthermore, there may be a problem with employee incentives.  As a crude
generalization, Japanese financial institutions appear to be excessively biased toward negative
incentives.  Poor performance or mistakes can knock a career manager off the path to the top
management positions, whereas great success does not accelerate that progress.  This can lead
managers to be overly cautious (a caution that may take the form of  sticking to standardized
behavior, such as lending to long-term clients even if those clients are no longer really
creditworthy).  Or if they discover problems, the preference will be to hide those problems during
tenure in a particular post (thereby passing the problems along to the next holder of the position)
rather than exposing the problems and dealing with them aggressively.  Traders, meanwhile, are
generally not rewarded much for their actual market performance.  For them the fear of showing a
loss predominates (leading to the increasingly desperate behavior of the individual who eventually
lost the $2 billion for Daiwa bank).  Traders need a monetary incentive to encourage positive
performance and they need the leeway to make short-term mistakes without punishment and fear. 
In markets with risk, traders will not win all the time and need to operate in a framework that
tolerates some losses and establishes rules for when to cut the losses.  But the Japanese incentive
structure appears to insert too much fear about admitting losses.  Both the tradition of career
management rotation emphasizing general (human relations) skills and the avoidance of monetary
rewards for superior performance are fundamental components of corporate personnel practices
in Japan, suggesting that it will be difficult for the financial sector to alter its practices.
Household Savings Behavior.  Financial deregulation presupposes a population willing
to take advantage of the changes—individuals willing to take invest in the new financial
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instruments and take advantage of lower transactions costs.  But the Japanese public remains
distinctively risk averse in its investment decisions, keeping a high share of its savings in the form
of bank accounts.  In 1995, Japanese households held a very large 62 percent of their total
financial assets in the form of cash and bank deposits (compared to only 23 percent in the case of
American households), as shown in Table 3.  The contrast with the United States is startling, but
the preference for bank deposits has not changed much over time; in 1977 the share in currency
Table 3
Household Financial Portfolios
       Japan             United States
  March 1977         March 1996                          1996 
Currency and Demand Deposits 15.6 10.0 3.8 
Time and Savings Deposits 57.9 51.8 21.5 
Insurance 13.2 25.4 5.0 
Stocks and Bonds 13.3 12.8 69.7 
Note: Based on flow of funds accounts.  U.S. data includes two items not found in the Japanese
data--proprietors’ equity and pension reserves.  Both are excluded from this table for the sake of
comparison.
Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual, 1977, pp. 24, and 1996, p. 267; and U.S.
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977, p. 511.  
and bank deposits was 73 percent.  The modest downward drift of this share was entirely in favor
of increased life insurance, and not increased holdings of stocks and bonds.  There are two ways
to interpret these data.  Optimists view this outcome as simply the result of regulation, so that the
Big Bang will result in a rapid increase of household holdings of securities.  Pessimists view the
situation as the result of a deeply ingrained risk aversion among households, so that the Big Bang
is unlikely to alter household portfolio behavior very much. 
In the absence of an eager household sector, financial deregulation could leave Japan still
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characterized with a high degree of intermediation, in which the holders of the new financial
instruments appearing in the market are mainly the banks.  This was the story of corporate bonds
in the 1980s; as the corporate bond market was gradually decontrolled and allowed to expand, the
primary purchasers of corporate bonds were banks, resulting in little alteration in the real flow of
funds or in the way institutions handled information and made decisions.  In Japan, 77 percent of
corporate bonds in 1996 were held by the banking sector (47 percent by commercial banks and 30
percent by government-owned financial institutions, with households holding only 10 percent.  In
the United States, banks hold only 4 percent of corporate bonds, households 13 percent, and
other financial institutions 68 percent (representing mainly investment banks and insurance
companies, providing indirect ownership for households through pension funds, money market
and mutual funds).31  
At the very least, alteration of household investment patterns will require increased public
confidence in the stability of the new financial instruments.  But many of the new innovations
imply a higher expected return at higher levels of risk, and it remains entirely unclear whether the
public understands the trade off between risk and expected return or is willing to accept it.  
The Japanese government and media have portrayed the “big bang” financial reforms as an
epochal change.  Certainly the proposed changes are a step in the right direction--if all the
proposed reforms are implemented fully.  But for all the reasons sketched above, the outcome will
be far less dramatic than supposed.
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Conclusion
Neither the macroeconomic setting nor the structural problems of the financial sector are
encouraging.  At the present time, Japan appears to face several years in which growth will remain
below potential and financial sector problems continue to fester.  Even potential growth is not
high (perhaps 2 percent now, and even lower in the next several decades because of demographic
reasons), so below-potential growth represents a truly disappointing performance.
Afraid of the perceived uncertainties and costs of an American-style reliance on freely
functioning markets, the public is not rallying around the notion of reform.  People certainly vote
for deregulation with their pocket books--they flock to discount stores and cheap airline tickets--
but do not clearly favor policies which would drive deregulation more strongly.  Politicians and
businesses have too much vested in the existing system, and have few ideas of how they would
function in a deregulated environment.  Even in the current sluggish environment, relatively little
pain exists; the level of affluence is high and unemployment has not increased much.  Therefore,
the public is not sufficiently disenchanted with the existing system to demand change, and
certainly anxious about the possible consequences of change.
Stumbling along with a some deregulation and some stimulus to the economy provided on
a largely ah hoc basis seems to be the most likely scenario.  Major collapse is unlikely.  Like an o-
mikoshi procession, MOF will lurch along, adopting stimulative policies just before the point
where the economy heads into serious recession.  And MOF will do whatever possible to prevent
major collapse in the financial sector, even if its policies actually prolong weakness in the system.
All of this is very discouraging.  Once Japan had finished its century-long catch-up with
the West by the mid-1970s, the time had come for major structural change in the economic
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system.  Although piecemeal and grudging deregulation and structural change did occur over the
next 20 years, there was little fundamental reform.  Now the needed changes seem more evident,
but the vested interests have only become stronger.  A vigorous, dissatisfied, entrepreneurial
younger generation could conceivably force change, but they represent the beginning of the baby-
bust generation and may not have the numbers to drive reform.
This appaisal of the financial sector also holds implications for our views of other aspects
of the Japanese economy.  Economic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of lifetime
employment, Japanese-style long-term contracting, “J-firm” corporate governance, and other
aspects of the economic system needs to be rethought.  When the economy was performing well,
the tendency was to seek the explanation for success in many of these distinctive features of the
economy.  Were they really beneficial in the past?  And if so, do we need to more carefully or
narrowly define those benefits?  Are they still beneficial?  Have we neglected or underestimated
some of the costs of these structures?  Have they, like finance, become ossified or atrophied over
time, so that vested interests and established relationships now interfere sufficiently with economic
rationality as to have a debilitating impact on the economy? Sadly, the misfortune of Japan
provides a rich research agenda.
